

Valentin FALIN writes<sup>1, 2</sup> that from today's perspective it is difficult to determine who Admiral CANARIS served eagerly, the British or the Americans, and who - London or Washington - made better use of the possibility of German defense. For the Western Allies were extraordinarily narrow-minded about sharing captured secrets.

Cooperation with the highest authorities in the German defense gave the American and British sides access to authentic information about the highest representatives of the Third Reich and its institutions and about the most important operations of the German Wehrmacht. The nuclear program was probably one of them, because Admiral CANARIS showed a special interest in everything to do with the German atomic bomb.

Another effect of the contacts between Intelligence and the Allies was that Admiral CANARIS introduced a large group of people to the western powers or helped them to establish useful contacts with foreign representatives. The best-known names among the two or three dozen personalities who carried out Admiral CANARIS' contact orders or used his services for their own purposes were Helmuth James VON MOLTKE, Hans VON DOHNANYI, Dietrich BONHOEFFER, Josef MÜLLER and Otto JOHN.

In the OSS documents, counterintelligence is referred to under the code name Organization 659<sup>1</sup>. Sometimes '659' also referred to Admiral CANARIS personally. The OSS was aware that German intelligence was monitoring most of the opposition's foreign contacts. Your participation in an action was regarded as a kind of recommendation.

The German counter-espionage services of the SD and Gestapo knew that vital state secrets were leaking out, but only seldom penetrated to the leaks, specifically to those who carried them out and their backers.

Defense Captain WERNICKE investigated in Paris against Defense Major Dr. Hans KEMRITZ, who, with the help of a transmitter on Ave

<sup>1</sup> Valentin FALIN, *Second Front. The conflicts of interest of the anti-Hitler coalition*, Knaur, Munich 1997, pp. 391 f., 359 f., 421, 543 and 545

<sup>2</sup> Franz KUROWSKI, *German commandos 1939-45*, vol. 2, Motorbuch, Stuttgart 2003, p. 118 ff.

CANARIS introduced them to the Allies, from left: Helmuth James VON MOLTKE, Hans VON DOHNANYI, Dietrich BONHOEFFER, and Otto JOHN.



nue de Jena had data, locations and tonnage sent to the Allies about the sea supplies for ROMMEL 's Afrika Korps . However, WERNICKE was unable to get hold of KEMRITZ , who may have gotten his information from high-ranking traitors.<sup>1</sup>

1 Hans MEISER, *Betrayed Traitors*, Druffel, Stegen 2006, p. 277 ff.

Influential officers of the German counter-intelligence who were not part of the conspirators had noticed as early as 1940 that something was wrong with several high-ranking personalities of the Third Reich, without however being allowed to get to the source of the information. French files that had been stolen gave clear indications that the French secret service, the Service des Renseignements, was also served by two or three high-ranking military or civilian officials. However, Admiral CANARIS had the secured French documents sealed away from representatives of the other Reich ministries as well.

2 Oskar REILE, *The German Secret Service in World War II. Western Front*, Weltbild, Augsburg 1989, pp. 56-59.

They had to stay in Paris. In 1942 the documents disappeared.<sup>2</sup>

Existed a joint plan by German and Allied Ge home service with the aim of a German defeat in the West?

While CANARIS aroused more and more distrust among HITLER and the OKW through insufficient and misleading information as well as 'failed' counter-intelligence missions , he masterfully managed to protect and camouflage his own acts of high and state treason as well as those of his friends up until 1944.<sup>3</sup>

3 Hans MEISER, *Betrayed Traitors*, Druffel, Stegen 2006, 5.99-103.

To date, there has never been a comprehensive study of the extent to which Admiral CANARIS' actions caused HITLER 's plans in Spain , Italy and North Africa to fail. It is also unclear to what extent the chief of German counterintelligence was responsible for the fact that the numerous serious Soviet political peace feelers were repeatedly rejected by the German side from August 1941 onwards. On the second day of the Russian campaign , CANARIS also ensured that the nationalities problem of the multi-ethnic state of the Soviet Union was not taken up by the Germans in good time.<sup>4</sup> In short, CANARIS behaved like a genuine representative of the interests of the Western powers with the German leadership.

4 Franz KUROWSKI, *German Commando Squads 1939-45*, Vol. 2, Motorbuch, Stuttgart 2003, p. 118 ff.

As early as the end of 1942, the chief of German counterintelligence had submitted peace proposals to his English counterpart Sir MENZIE , but these were then interrupted after the intervention of the British Foreign Ministry, which did not want to risk problems with its ally STALIN .

Nevertheless, the negotiations between the high representatives of the two opposing intelligence services continued, and it

It should be clear that steps were also agreed with one another that were intended to facilitate Operation Rankin in Europe. There were later rumors among the employees of the American OSS intelligence service that the head of the OSS, Bill DONOVAN, and Admiral CANARIS, as already mentioned, met in Spain in March or April 1943 and again in Istanbul in late summer or spring had. However, Russian sources say that so far there is no direct evidence that these encounters actually took place. However, a joint meeting of CANARIS, DONOVAN and MENZIE in Santander, Spain, which took place in the summer of 1943, is documented. This meeting also went back to an initiative of Admiral CANARIS. The latter also brought a peace plan with him: armistice in the west, elimination or extradition of HITLER, continuation of the war in the east. It is sensational that the defense officer Justus VON EINEM, who accompanied Admiral CANARIS as a member of the delegation in Santander, later reported that the three chiefs of the intelligence services had come to an agreement on the basis of Admiral CANARIS' proposals,<sup>1</sup> even if the secret files about this Meetings that have not been published to date, much of what happened later in the context of the Normandy invasion must be traced back to the Santander agreements of the summer of 1943.

<sup>1</sup> Valentin FAUN, *Second Front The Conflicts of Interest of the Anti-Hitler Coalition*, Knauer, Munich 1997, pp. 359 and 391.

### **Stab or patriotism – the German**

#### **offer to the Allies before the Normandy invasion** Apparently, key German

forces wanted to help the Western Allies establish a bridgehead in France. In November 1943 Helmut Graf VON MOLTKE traveled to Turkey. In this case, he acted as a liaison for Admiral CANARIS and other military officials who were looking for ways to coordinate their actions with the highest command of the democracies.<sup>2</sup> MOLTKE's considerations, which he asked the US leadership to take note of, were by CSS employees Hans WILBRANDT and Alexander RÜSTOW in

summarized in a report to OSS chief Bill DONOVAN under the telling headline: "Exposure of readiness of a powerful German group to prepare and support Allied military operations against Nazi Germany." This exposé also became known as the 'Herman Plan'. The Allied war aims were then recognized as justified and necessary by a "powerful German group" - whatever that might mean.

<sup>1</sup> Valentin FAUN, *Second Front The Conflicts of Interest of the Anti-Hitler Coalition*, Knauer, Munich 1997, pp. 359-400.

The head of the OSS confirmed the seriousness of the group, but its weakness was the lack of mass support.

There was another document later, the 'Leverkuehn Brief'. It was developed in Ankara by Dr. Paul LEVERKUEHN, who was in close contact with OSS chief DONOVAN. LEVERKUEHN's letter stated that the 'opposition could not guarantee that the entire western front would remain completely inactive in the event of an Allied invasion. However, it has such influence over the commanders of the ground forces and, to some extent, the Luftwaffe in the west that the German response to the landing units of the USA and Great Britain could at least be delayed.

In January 1944, two delegates from what the Americans called the Breakers group approached Allan DULLES in Bern. Great Britain also received similar offers via Stockholm.



Hans Bernd GISEVIUS

On May 13, just before the start of the Normandy invasion, Hans Bernd GISEVIUS - a prominent opposition figure who was also OSS Agent Number 512 - disclosed state secrets of the highest importance to the Americans, including the fact that some American and British codes had been broken, as well as information about the development of V1 and V-2. In addition, with the help of GISEVIUS, the OSS office in Bern received a dossier of over 4,000 densely written pages, which contained the full background of a plot against HITLER that was being prepared. On May 13, 1944, GISEVIUS reported to his clients that the conspirators were ready to support the Anglo-American troops invading Germany if the USA and Great Britain allowed them to keep the eastern front.

Just twenty days before the Allied landings began, another document was sent to US Secretary of State Cordell HULL

delivered to the BECK-GOERDELER group with the telling title: "Attempt by German Generals and the Civilian Opposition to Reach a Separate Armistice."

According to information received by the Gestapo after the failed assassination attempt on Adolf HITLER on July 20, 1944, Colonel STAUFFENBERG was also in contact with the British in the spring of 1944. In addition to purely military questions, lists of people with whom one could enter into negotiations were to be examined. Colonel STAUFFENBERG had told GOERDELER several times that he could bring his information directly to CHURCHILL.

STAUFENBERG had also established contact with the American high command through Otto JOHN .

In fact, at the start of the Allied landings in France, the main forces of the Wehrmacht in France and Belgium, reserve units in Germany, and also the intelligence and rear services were under the control of HITLER's opponents. With coordinated and determined action, the opposition was objectively able to disorganize the western front and open the borders of the Reich to Western Allied troops. The American and British commanders responsible for the Normandy invasion loved it!

In the end, the Allies wanted to act according to their 'Overlord' plan, giving the German generals a chance to dissolve their western front on their own initiative. It was made clear to the German partners that they had to postpone policy until better times, and they were given EISENHOWER's staff as their partner in discussing any question of a separate ceasefire.

So let's consider what about details and people of the German helpers of General EISENHOWER has become known.

### **The ›Hermann Plan‹**

The 'Hermann Plan' was an important document presented to the JCS (the Joint Committee of Chiefs of Staff) by OSS chief DONOVAN . This is said to be a summary of the offer that Helmuth VON MOLTKE sent to the Americans in Istanbul in November 1943. It was about the willingness of a powerful German group to prepare and support Allied military operations against Nazi Germany.

According to OSS information, the group was made up of key figures from the military and civil service hierarchy, churches, trade unions, as well as influential industrialists and intellectuals.

The group took the following position in the document:<sup>1</sup> »The defeat and occupation of Germany are morally and politically necessary for the future of the nation.

The demand for unconditional surrender is justified. Discussions about peace conditions before the capitulation has taken place are premature... An important prerequisite for the success of the plan is an intact eastern front, which at the same time is in good condition

<sup>1</sup> Valentin FAUN, *Second Front The Conflicts of Interest of the Anti-Hitler Coalition*, Knauer, Munich 1997, pp. 359-400.

dangerously close to the German border, for example the Tilsit-Lemberg line. Such a situation would justify radical decisions in the West before national consciousness as the only means of anticipating the overwhelming danger in the East.

The Group is prepared to implement the broadest possible military cooperation plan with the Allies, provided that the use of the military information, assets and authority at the Group's disposal is combined with a full Allied military engagement so that a Rapid, decisive success across the board is certain. This victory over HITLER, followed by an occupation of all of Germany by the Allies as quickly as possible, would suddenly change the political situation in such a way that the real voice of Germany would be heard...

If it is decided to create the second front in the West through an all-out, all-encompassing operation, and this to be followed by a total occupation of Germany, the group stands ready to support the Allied operation with all the important resources at its disposal. To this end, it would be prepared, after precise agreement, to have a senior officer flown to a specific Allied country as its representative in order to coordinate plans for cooperation with the Allied High Command."

Do we have here the 'master plan' for betrayal and sabotage on the German western front in the summer of 1944? Of course, the document is a summary of the OSS agents RÜSTOW and WILBRANDT, so that theoretically there is also the possibility that VON MOLTKE'S offer could have been creatively processed by the OSS agents. But there are simply too many points in the 'Hermann Plan' that can be found with many later testimonies by conspirators in Gestapo reports after July 20, 1944, and also with publications by survivors of the German resistance in the post-war period agree in order not to give it a high degree of credibility.

What was also striking about the document was that there was an offer not to dissolve the eastern front, which at that time still ran from the Black Sea to the vicinity of Leningrad, in contrast to the western front, but to move it dangerously close to the German border. In this way, the German citizen was supposed to be credibly sold the 'rescue from the West from the Asian hordes'. Doesn't this point to systematic sabotage by high-ranking Germans?

Personalities also on the German Ostheer? Interestingly, the line envisaged in the document was still far enough removed from the numerous holdings held by many of General EISENHOWER's aides in the eastern territories of the German Empire.

What remains decisive is that the 'Hermann Plan' was an offer to support all Western Allied war aims, including the unconditional surrender and complete occupation of Germany, with all our might. As it stands, the German side did not ask for anything in return.

### **dr Paul Leverkuehn, key figure between Western Allies and General Eisenhower's aides?**

Just before the invasion, Dr. Paul LEVERKUEHN a letter to the US intelligence chief Bill DONOVAN ,<sup>1</sup> offering the Allied High Command, fearing a failure of the landing, that the German Luftwaffe and ground force response to the landing units could be delayed if the Western Allies, in return, after a coup d'état with the new German government would enter into negotiations.

<sup>1</sup> Valentin FALIN, *Second Front The Conflicts of Interest of the Anti-Hitler Coalition*, Knaur, Munich 1997, 5,400.

The exact Allied response has disappeared (or been destroyed?) in the archives to this day. We do know, however, that on July 20, 1944, not a single Allied aircraft flew into Reich territory, despite the best flying weather, while the most massive Allied air force actions were taking place in Italy and France 'as always'. After the assassination attempt on Adolf HITLER failed on July 20, the air raids on Reich territory were resumed immediately.

who was this dr Paul Leverkuehn? The lawyer, politician and secret agent Paul LEVERKUEHN died in 1960 as a highly respected member of post-war German society.<sup>2</sup> During the First World War he was already a participant in the secret SCHEUBNER-RICHTER expedition to the Turkish-Persian border region.

<sup>2</sup> Jan G. HEITMANN (ed.), *Newsletter* no. 5 (Summer 1996), International Intelligence History Association, [www.intelligencehistory.org/new](http://www.intelligencehistory.org/new)

Between. At war he worked as a legal expert for the Foreign Office, the 'Mixed Commission for German Claims' and sat on the board of directors of a New York bank. At that time he was also in touch with future OS5 boss Bill DOKOVAN.

Sent to Istanbul by Admiral CANARIS , he was from 1941 to 1944 head of the German secret service in Turkey.

In fact, many of the actions of the Germans, especially in the first phase of the invasion, can be linked to the pledges

be brought, which were in LEVERKUEHN's letter to the American intelligence chief.

On May 13, 1944, the OSS, through agent GISEVIUS , received a highly dramatic German proposal in which the conspirators offered to assist Anglo-American troops in invading Germany. Allied airborne divisions in Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen were to jump out with the support of »mutiny of the Wehrmacht units«

1 Valentin FAUN, *Second Front. The Conflicts of Interest of the Anti-Hitler Coalition*, Knauer, Munich 1997, pp. 418 and 420.

The organizational scheme by which the German Allied aides on the Western Front actively obstructed German defense efforts in the West has (understandably) never been made public.

The precisely coordinated resistance measures before, during and after the invasion always followed the same basic pattern and suggest the existence of military preparations.

There were several organization centers in the OKW, in Paris, St. Germain and at La Roche-Guyon, who communicated with each other in various ways, instead of attending to their proper task of defending the Atlantic front against the threatened landings. General SPEIDEL spoke of "oases" here. Full of pride, he wrote in 1949: "Leading personalities from the Reich came almost every day to speak out in the oasis of ROMMEL's staff (but not with ROMMEL himself - note GEORG), far from the clutches of the Gestapo, to find ways out of a rescue from the to look for an increasingly hopeless situation. «2 Of course, the later NATO commander SPEIDEL did not dare to explain that this »rescue« was about bringing about unconditional surrender and about the occupation of Germany by means of a military cooperation plan that was as far-reaching as possible went to the Allies.

2 Hans SPEIDEL, *Invasion 1944*, Rainer Wunderlich, Tübingen 1949, p. 84.

This only became known decades later when the Soviet author Valentin FALIN published the details from Soviet secret archives.

The causes of the German military defeat in Normandy therefore largely go back to organized acts of treason and sabotage in all areas of warfare by the fighting German troops. Now it also becomes clear how the events described at the beginning of the book fit together.

In a nutshell: It was all about the her bring about one's own defeat.



### **The Mystery of 'General Eisenhower's Aides'**

General EISENHOWER's helpers shared the goal of making the Allied landings a success.

The exact outlines of the group are still unknown. Even today, the British and American secret services are very particular about opening their archives to certain aspects of the Second World War. Large parts of the 'Sledgehammer' and 'Rankin' plans are still not accessible as far as intelligence operations are concerned.

The names of the German agents and contacts are guarded very closely, unless they give up their incognito or accidentally find themselves in the spotlight. But the facts speak for themselves!

Arranged according to groups, 'General EISENHOWER's helpers ' can be divided into two categories. What they had in common was that they wanted to prevent Hitler's victory .

The 'ideologues' wanted cooperation with the USA and Great Britain in the planned landing of the Allies in France, right down to supporting the parachuting of Allied troops at key points in Germany. The main goal was to be able to hold a generous front line against the Russians in the east and to transfer the troops that were becoming free in the west to the eastern front. The ideal was to rally the British and Americans to defend Germany against the 'Bolsheviks'.

The group of 'practitioners' had less lofty goals. The point here was simply to take measures to ensure that the Allied landings were a success. Their goal was a quick Allied victory over the German Wehrmacht. In this way the Third Reich was to perish and the western powers should be able to achieve their war goal of an unconditional surrender of the Third Reich. The planners of this group were aware that if the Allied landings in France were not successful, an unconditional surrender of the Third Reich would mean that the Soviet Union would advance to the Atlantic.

The group of 'ideologues' had many supporters among representatives of the military resistance of July 20, 1944. The group of 'practitioners' was the most successful, albeit to date the most secretive, group among General EISENHOWER's German aides.

In May 1944, shortly before the invasion, the agent GISEVSIUS had to tell the conspirators not to hope that the Western Allies would break with the Soviets. Even without their old "business basis," EISENHOWER's German aides replied shortly before the July 20 assassination that they had agreed to surrender unconditionally to the Soviet Russian forces as well as to the American and British forces as soon as HITLER was dead .<sup>1</sup> However, this answer must have fueled the fear among the Anglo-Americans that the Germans were also working on an 'eastern solution'.

1 Hans MEISER, *Betrayed Traitors*, Druffel, Stegen 2006, p. 109.

2 Thomas VOGEL (ed.), *Rebellion of conscience. Military resistance against Hitler and the NS regime 1933-45*, Mittler, Hamburg 2001, p. 237 f.


3 Samuel W. MITCHAM Jr., *The Desert Fox in Normandy* (Cooper Square 2001), p. 50.

## Who belonged to the military opposition to Hitler in the West?

At the time of the Allied landings in France, the core of the "conspirators" included the military commander in occupied France, General Heinrich VON STÜLPNAGEL, the city commander of Paris, General BOINEBURG-LENGSFELD, the commander of the German troops in Belgium and northern France, General Alexander VON FALKENHAUSEN, and General Hans SPEIDEL, the Chief of Staff of Army Group B, and a number of high-ranking officers from all three branches of the service, most of whom have remained unknown to this day.<sup>2</sup> Other suspicious decision-makers include General DOLLMANN, the Commander-in-Chief of the 7th Army. According to American information, the general, who was originally a 'Nazi model general', developed into an active opponent of the Third Reich during the course of the war . Hans BUWERT, led by the Foreign Office with the leadership of the French

From left: Henry

VON STÜLPNAGEL, Hans BOINEBURG-LENGSFELD, Erwin VON WITZLEBEN and Alexander VON FALKENHAUSEN.





Gert VON RUNDSTEDT (here with General Alfred GAUSE) at the chart table at headquarters in Paris. The Commander-in-Chief West was awarded the Oak Leaves on July 2, 1944 and dismissed by HITLER .

In September 1944, however, it was reinstated. He primarily sought a separate peace with the Anglo-Americans on.

schen publishing house of the Hachette Group,<sup>1</sup> established connections in Madrid and Lisbon in order to discuss negotiation possibilities with the Allies. VON STÜLPNAGEL had gone even further and had established contacts with the French Resistance, in one case even involving a colonel from DE GAULLE's army, and negotiated with them in order to achieve cooperation after a successful coup d'état.

The Paris stage lent itself perfectly to conspiracies. Paris was far off the beaten track and also offered the added convenience of a post on the Eastern Front. Far away from headquarters and from Berlin, one also felt considerably undisturbed and unobserved. It was therefore far less difficult, with the help of a 'mafia' intriguing in key positions, to build up a widely ramified circle of conspirators without being observed. Good family relations did their part.<sup>2</sup> Marshals VON RUNDSTEDT (Mayor West), ROMMEL (Mayor Army Group B) and VON KLUGE (VON RUNDSTEDT's successor) were special cases.

Commander-in-Chief VON RUNDSTEDT did not join the conspiracy of July 20, 1944. However, he tolerated the activities of the conspirators in his area and was close to the idea of letting the English and Americans march in freely and moving the German troops to the east as quickly as possible.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Otto Ernst REMER, *Conspiracy and Treason about Hitler*, Remer and Heipke, Bad Kissingen 1993, p. 101.

<sup>2</sup> Thomas VOGEL (ed.), *Rebellion of conscience. Military resistance against Hitler and the NS regime 1933-45*, Mittler, Hamburg 2001, pp. 237-242.

<sup>3</sup> Statements of General EBERBACHS in English captivity, in: Sönke NEITZEL, *Abhör , Propyläen*, 2006, p. 137.

They belonged to the ›Black Chapel‹ conspiracy group, from left: Eberhard FINCKH, Hans SPEIDEL, Alexis VON ROENNE and (below) Caesar VON HOFACKER AND Eduard WAGNER.



According to Hans MEISER, VON RUNDSTEDT was just as much a conspirator in the 'Black Band' as were FINCKH, SPEIDEL and VON ROENNE.<sup>16b</sup> Although he refused to join EISENHOWER's helpers, he tolerated their activities on his staff. He is said to have been ready to act only if the Anglo-Americans agreed (never received) to separate actions.<sup>1</sup> Field Marshal ROMMEL was not considered one of their own in the circle of the conspirators, and since he was considered unreliable, it was understood sent him to assign Lieutenant General Hans SPEIDEL as Chief of Staff of the Army Group he led as an active co-conspirator.

From August 1, 1940, Colonel iG SPEIDEL was Chief of Staff of the Military Commander in France. As a student of General BECK, he came into contact with the military resistance in France. However, SPEIDEL belonged to the ›Georgsrunde‹, an elite and exclusive circle of intellectuals named after the salon in the Parisian hotel ›Georg V‹. Nothing could be found out about the other members of the "Georgs Runde". In April 1944, SPEIDEL became Chief of Staff of Army Group B (ROMMEL). The author did not succeed in finding out who put SPEIDEL in this place. Was SPEIDEL a kind of link between the conspirators of 20th July and another group, still unknown to this day, who also counted on an Allied victory?

For ROMMEL, defending against the invasion was an affair of the heart. The fact that the Normandy front could be held together in June and July 1944 was mainly due to the leadership of Erwin ROMMEL, the hero of North Africa. ROMMEL did incredible things in preparing the German defenses. During the invasion campaign he went to the front almost every day and

<sup>1</sup> Hans MEISER, *Betrayed Traitors*, Druffel, Stegen 2006, p. 149 f.

raised up the young troops and their faltering commanders. Then he returned to his headquarters in the castle of La Roche Guyon and at night begged whoever would listen in Germany for more troops, tanks and supplies.

While ROMMEL was unable to perform any of his dramatic tank evasion maneuvers in Normandy, he remained a master of improvisation, plugging holes in the middle of the front line and repeatedly inflicting heavy Allied casualties. He conducted his best campaign to date in Normandy. It is perfectly clear that

ROMMEL was convinced in mid-June 1944 that the game was for Germany



Marshal Erwin ROMMEL  
- here in June 1944 in  
front of a downed cargo  
glider on the Orne - tried  
tirelessly to bundle all  
forces to successfully  
repel the invasion. From:  
David IRVING, *Rommel*,  
Weltbild, Augsburg 1990.

be over in the west. On June 29, 1944, VON RUNDSTEDT and ROMMEL HITLER reported that the defense could not be maintained with the available forces in the west and that the war had to be considered lost.

Alexis VON ROENNE's misrepresentations about the Allied 'main power', which was still waiting to be deployed in England, also contributed to ROMMEL's pessimism. Would ROMMEL have acted in the same way if he had known that the Allies had long since thrown everything they had into the fray and that ammunition had already begun to be rationed in other theaters of war in favor of the invasion front? Probably a strategy of the Ver

sworn to induce ROMMEL to give up the western front by falsely declaring strength.

In the midst of the bitter invasion battles, on July 9, 1944, Caesar VON HOFACKER, a trusted colleague of STÜLPNAGEL and cousin of VON STAUFFENBERG, appeared at ROMMEL. He produced a memorandum urging the Field Marshal to end the war in the West on his own. ROMMEL declared that the front would only hold out for a maximum of 14 days to 3 weeks anyway. It was supposedly agreed that ROMMEL would receive another report on the coup plans by July 15. However, it is very controversial whether ROMMEL agreed to help the conspirators. Nobody informed him beforehand about the planned attack on HITLER .

As in North Africa, ROMMEL wanted to act alone. However, as in 1942, he hoped for HITLER's subsequent approval of his arbitrariness.

In addition, ROMMEL tackled practical preparations for withdrawing from the war. Among other things, a radio link to the headquarters of the invasion forces was tested. The mood among the front generals had been sounded out for a long time, and everyone wanted to support ROMMEL , even the SS in France.

On July 15, 1944, GOERDELER tried to persuade Marshals VON KLUGE and ROMMEL to surrender in the west and immediately move all troops to the east. Adolf HITLER was to be given the choice of either participating or resigning.

We will never know whether Field Marshal ROMMEL , who was also recognized by the Allies , would have been successful in his efforts to end the war in the West. On July 16, ROMMEL was badly wounded when his car was badly hit by a fighter-bomber. When the bomb attack on HITLER failed and the Allies broke through the German front in August 1944, ROMMEL was badly wounded in the hospital and could no longer influence things.

Field Marshal Hans KLUGE was considered a 'neutralist'. As early as the end of 1942 he came into contact with the conspirators against HITLER on the eastern front , tolerated them and was informed about all the important events, but without personally taking an active part in them. After the failure of the German counterattack on Avranches and strange events in the pocket near Falaise, VON KLUGE took up arms on 19.

August 1944, because HITLER sensed treason and had ordered him back to Berlin. We'll come back to that later.

Between the conspirators in Berlin and their accomplices in

Zossen, the seat of the OKH (High Command of the Army), and the headquarters in Paris, there were constant and special contacts.

Major General Helmuth STIEFF, Head of the OKH Organization Department, General Quartermaster General of Artillery Eduard WAGNER, who was responsible for supplies, and Colonel FINCKH, General Quartermaster West, also played important roles in the course of the Battle of Normandy. In a later conversation with Field Marshal VON KLUGE, Field Marshal ROMMEL blamed General WAGNER for the loss of the Normandy Battle.

The inadequate actions of the OKW (High Command of the Wehrmacht), the army and the air force, the secret services, the telecommunications system and the supply system indicate that, in addition to the conspirators of July 20, 1944, who are known today, there were other influential people who had a early end of the war in the West sympathized. This is also confirmed by post-war Russian sources, but without naming names.<sup>1</sup> This can only mean that the Soviet Union was able to take advantage of some of these people in the war or post-war period.

The activities of this second group did not end after the failed assassination attempt on Adolf HITLER.

If you believe Field Marshal Albert KESSELRING, General EISEN HOWER's helpers were almost blown after all. In the spring of 1945, KESSELRING had been given the unenviable task of stabilizing the crumbling western front from HITLER. The energetic KESSELRING quickly noticed some suspicious activities. Because the war ended so quickly, the investigations he carried out into "strange events" could no longer be completed, and so the names of these people remain unknown to this day.<sup>2</sup>

1 A. Valentin FALIN, *Second Front. The conflicts of interest of the anti-Hitler coalition*, Knauer, Munich 1997, p. 427.

2 Albert KESSELRING, *Soldier until the last day*, Bublies, Schnellbach 2000, pp. 348, 357, 382 a

## **Paris-London secret air link?**

There is evidence that direct air transport contacts between the Allies and the German resistance were envisaged.

For fear of discovery, direct negotiations between the Allies and the German military resistance had to take place up to that point via neutral countries, indirect contacts (business, Vatican) or encrypted radio messages. General Erich FELLGIEBEL, General of Communications in the German Wehrmacht, also had secret telephone lines laid from the Führer's headquarters to Switzerland in order to monitor the actions of the

to make conspirators in favor of the Allies possible. While this connection, which ran via an undisclosed Berlin circuit, could only be uncovered after July 20th through the attention of a sergeant in good time before it was 'eliminated', this never succeeded with the other headquarters-enemy connections sought by FELLGIEBEL's successor, General PRAUN. The line to Sweden was probably dismantled in good time, while the connections from the OKW, OKH and Fuhrer Headquarters to England remained active undisturbed until the end of the war and repeatedly brought HITLER almost to despair until his death in the Berlin Führerbunker. Intimate messages from the Fuhrer's headquarters could thus be published after just a few hours by the Allied propaganda station Radio Calais.<sup>1, 2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hella PRAUN (ed.), *Albert Praun. A German (soldier) life 1894-1975*, Hella Praun, Munich 2004, p. 245 f.

<sup>2</sup> Joseph BELLINGER, *Himmler's Death. Suicide or Murder?*, Arndt, Kiel 2005, p. 180.

<sup>3</sup> Hans MEISER, *Betrayed Traitors*, Druffel, Stegen 2006, p. 155.

<sup>4</sup> Eric BROWN, *Famous Air Force Aircraft 1939-45*, Motorbuch, Stuttgart gartl 988, p. 159.

However, the abandonment of the western front planned by both sides required direct personal contacts and agreements between the responsible persons on both sides.

In June 1943, on behalf of CANARIS in Istanbul, Count MOLTKE had offered the OSS that, if the Allies were able to land in France, a German General Staff officer would be sent to England who had the necessary knowledge to to arrange for the Western Allies to open up the western German front.<sup>3</sup> The 'Hermann Plan' of November of the same year contained a similar offer.

In fact, such shuttle flights between Germany and England do not belong in the realm of the imagination.<sup>4</sup> In the night of May 20th to 21st, 1941, Lieutenant Heinrich SCHMITT flew to England in a Dornier Do 217 and landed in Lincoln.

SCHMITT, son of a secretary to the former Foreign Minister STRESEMANN, had been working as a spy since 1940. He was then selected by unknown authorities to deliver a sealed packet to a member of British High Command.

Did he have evidence of the planned German invasion of Russia on April 21? June 1941 on board? In order to guide SCHMITT down safely, the airfield lighting was switched on specifically. After the package was handed over to a waiting English officer, Oberleutnant SCHMITT immediately set off again with his crew for Germany.

Before SCHMITT delivered a Ju 88 R-1 night fighter to the English as ordered on May 9, 1943 because of its ›Lichtenstein‹ radar device, he is said to have made further courier landings in England.





Westland ›Lysander‹ III (SD). RAF spy transporters often landed in France at night in 1944 and could have transported material or personnel from their German helpers to.

What happened after SCHMITT defected is unclear. Given the way the secret services work, one can assume that the proven spy would not have been withdrawn if suitable successors had not been available for him.

It is clear that such flights required a good deal of coordination between those involved in Germany and England in order not to end in a fiasco. As things stood, this could only work with the backing of higher ranks.

On the German side there was the mysterious Kampfgeschwader 200 (KG 200). It emerged in the spring of 1944 from the Ob.dL group (Commander in Chief of the Air Force). Part of this unit was specialized in dropping, supplying and retrieving its own agents from enemy territory and used captured enemy aircraft to deceive the enemy. The activities of the KG 200 to the use of agents stretched from Iraq to the Urals.

England was one of them!

Until the SS came to power in the field of secret services

In the course of 1944, KG 200 saw itself as a defense service provider for Admiral CANARIS, and if the high-ranking conspirators in the area of the Wehrmacht and OKL had needed a transport route to England for their material deliveries, couriers and negotiators, one had with the KG 200 had an experienced and secretive unit available to fulfill 'impossible orders'. In fact, the commodore of KG 200, Colonel Heinrich HEIGL, went right at the beginning of the invasion with his

Staff Major Dr. STORMER, his secretary Mrs. REHDER and an (unknown) non-commissioned officer to Paris.

1 Günther GELLERMANN, *Moscow calls Army Group Center*, Bernard & Graefe, Bonn 1988, p. 56 f.

There must have been important reasons why the commander went to Paris, although his actual command instrument, the squadron headquarters, was still in Berlin-Gathof. From there, the important operations of KG 200 were directed for weeks – without the commodore.<sup>1</sup>

It is clear that Colonel HEIGL did not go to Paris to rest. Did he get the order from a still unknown higher authority? Ever since HITLER had sidelined Admiral CANARIS in the spring of 1944 because of various mistakes in German counterintelligence, the Reich Security Main Office had taken control of all German counterintelligence and intelligence activities in quick succession. So if you wanted to do something outside these official channels' in the field of intelligence, it was only possible in centers of resistance like Paris.

Unfortunately, it is still unknown to this day to what extent German aircraft actually managed to establish contact with the Allies in the summer of 1944. According to Gestapo investigation files in Russian archives, Colonel Georg HANSEN (the successor of Admiral CANARIS) and Colonel VON STAUFFENBERG had initiated contacts with General EISENHOWER and General MARSHALL at that time, and also Colonel Alexis VON ROENNE (Head of the Foreign Army West) had received authority from the heads of the conspiracy to communicate directly with the Anglo-American High Command in order to support the landing of the Allied troops.<sup>2</sup> Colonel HEIGL returned with his small group from France

2 Valentin FALIN, *Second Front. The conflicts of interest of the anti-Hitler coalition*, Knauer, Munich 1997, pp. 424 and 428.

to the United States after several weeks headquarters back to Berlin without it ever becoming known what he had to do in the French capital. Even in the post-war period, he and his former secretary Ms. REHDER allegedly had no memory of it.

Also the diary of Major Dr. STORMER did not yield any detects nit.

None of the members of I./KG 200, who were tasked with flying into enemy territory during the war, were willing to talk about this period. During the war they had signed a 'special commitment' that remained in effect well into the post-war period. They also took with them the secret of the extent to which General EISENHOWER 's German helpers managed to maintain contact with the Allies by air.

The same applies to the recurring rumors that English Westland Lysander spy planes landed in France at night in 1944 in order to get in touch with high-ranking German officers. By August 1944, the 161st Squadron of the RAF flew 101 people to France and transported 128 passengers back to England.<sup>1</sup> It will probably never be known whether German messengers were among them.

<sup>1</sup> Air International Vol 26, No.2, *Some Talk of Alexander*, Fine Scroll 1984, p. 83 f.





## Chapter 7

# **The stab in the back of the fighting front**

It is disputed whether Field Marshal  
Gert VON RUNDSTEDT belonged  
to the military opposition, in any  
case he stood for a separate peace  
with the Anglo-Americans.

On the front he is (right) visiting  
ROMMEL in La Roche-Guyon. Left  
of ROMMEL: Lieutenant General

Hans SPEIDEL.

Note 5, page 221: In fact, the "defense" and some conspirators knew exactly what was about to happen, Paulus VON OBBERGEN ("Invasion 1944", in: *Die Grenzmark*, volume 7-9/1962, p. 14) quotes the court historian of the Foreign Office, WHEELER-BENNETT (*The Nemesis of Power*, p. 626), who adopted a report from the so-called »JOHN memorandum«: »At a meeting in LEBERS house, to have a bottle of wine, to promote and appoint STAUFFENBERG To celebrate, Otto JOHN brought the latest information to HANSENS [the successor CANARIS], which pointed to an almost imminent major landing in Normandy ... Since the date of STAUFFENBERG 's promotion was fixed, it was June 1, 1944, so he pretends to be astonishing The fact that on this day at least three people, namely Colonel HANSEN, Count STAUFFENBERG and Dr. Otto JOHN knew exactly about the landing data.«

**Fraud on the Atlantic Wall as early as 1943**

In 1943, HITLER appointed Walter FRENTZ , chief cameraman for star film director Leni RIEFENSTAHL, as “the Führer’s personal cameraman.” He was to constantly serve as a war correspondent in HITLER's environment. In addition, HITLER often used FRENTZ for secret missions to hotspots or new construction projects because he could not go to the inspection himself due to lack of time.

So his "personal cameraman" came to the Atlantic Wall in 1943 to take bunker shots there. As a result, the photos and film documents taken on the spot of the objects important to the war effort proved that HITLER was misinformed by his military and war economy advisers about the execution of the ordered measures. Julius SCHAUB reported on FRENTZ' mission that there were cases where alleged concrete blocks were only surrounded by a thin concrete wall, but were filled up with rubble and sand or were even hollow on the inside. The proven unreliability of his staff would have increased HITLER's distrust from case to case.<sup>1</sup> Even when Field Marshal Erwin ROMMEL took command of Army Group B in November 1943, he was systematically and massively deceived about the strength of the fortifications in Normandy , as reported by members of the 716th Infantry Division.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Olaf ROSE (ed.), *Julius Schaub. In Hitler's shadow*, Druffel, Stegen 2004, p. 226 fu 394

<sup>2</sup> Helmut Konrad VON KEUSCEN, D-Day 1944, p. 23, HEK Creativ Verlag, Bargsen 2005, p.

**General Eisenhower's aides strike!**

In 1944 General EISENHOWER's German aides did everything with great determination to ensure that the risky invasion of the West by the Anglo-Americans was a complete success. Although small in number and without support from the fighting troops, their high-ranking positions in the command and supply areas enabled them to set the course again and again in the direction of defeat for the Wehrmacht in France before, during and after the landing.

It looks like there has been a recent spike in suspicious activity, particularly from 1.0. up to the 4th day before D-Day. Apparently, a special role was played by »telephone orders« from the highest level without a sender, which were distributed among up to five places.<sup>3-5</sup> Now it is also clear that the incidents described above did not happen by chance, but were part of an overall concept which provided for the downfall of its own army.

<sup>3</sup> Statement by Theo MÜNZ to the author dated June 16, 2003

<sup>4</sup> Statement by eyewitness ›HAGEN‹ to the author on November 10, 2003



Provision of a heavy tank detachment with "Königtiger" type combat vehicles in northern France. From: H

Günther DAHMS, *The Second World War in text and images*, Herbig, Munich 41995.

In addition to weakening the defenses against the invasion in advance, the German helpers then made it easier for the Allies to cross the Channel undisturbed by the landing fleet and ensured that the defenders were "surprised" in time and place. Counterattacks that were promising in themselves were repeatedly delayed, uncoordinated or launched at the wrong place at high staff level. Furthermore, "man" saw to it that the infantry divisions of the 15th Army were tied up at the Pas-de-Calais and the armored reserve far from the landing area.

The effects of these measures will be dealt with on the following pages.

## Dept. 1: Disinformation instead of alarming

### June 6, 1944: the fake 'naval report' at 6:45 am

As early as June 5, 1944, naval radio measuring stations from Cherbourg, St. Nazaire, from the Channel Islands and from Cap Hague had recognized the approach of the invasion fleet with their radar and correctly reported it.



The radio location of the Kriegsmarine had already identified strong enemy naval forces in a whole series of grid squares on their naval waves "Atlantic" and "Channel" at about 9 p.m. The radio cadet Gerhard JUNGER, then a radio cadet in Paimboeuf, a few kilometers downstream on the Loire, described what followed: "We immediately got the officer on duty. Without him, many so-called Blitz and Gekados (secret command matters) radio messages had to be decoded by the intelligence officer. Soon our "radio booth" was packed with news-hungry superiors of all ranks. The incoming naval reports from the Channel coast were carefully followed and marked on a large map. It was clear to everyone among us that the long-awaited invasion had begun.

All this happened long before midnight!" Rear

Admiral Edward WEGENER wrote<sup>1</sup> that on June 6 at about 3:09 a.m. in the Normandy area the naval group received the decisive message: "Hundreds of ships heading south." It was now clear that where the invasion force would land. The aim of the armada was Normandy, not the Pas-de-Calais!

These reports, like the previous ones, were continuously forwarded to the Army Group and the Air Fleet. However, the key people there stuck to their own incorrect assessment of the situation until late in the morning of June 6, 1944.

To top it all off, at 6:45 a.m. an alleged 'naval report' was passed on to Army Group B by OB West. According to this, it was only at this time that the very first report from the naval group was received: "Strong ship formations in the West Canal and also in the East Canal." This would not have meant an invasion in Normandy, but in the area east of the Somme estuary in Pas-de-Calais. Rear Admiral WEGENER wrote indignantly in a letter to the editor of the *FAZ* on March 7, 1979 that the tenor and content of this 'naval report' certainly did not come from the Navy quite not reported in the ›Ostkanal‹. This was clearly a briefing from OB West that was summary and, on top of that, falsified the naval reports. Accordingly, OB West did not forward the current reports to Army Group B at all.

<sup>1</sup> Edward WEGENER, "Failures of the Navy", in: *FAZ* from 7.3. 1979, p. 44, letter to the editor.

<sup>2</sup> Gerhard YOUNGER, "The first alarms reports from the channel", in: *FAZ* of March 7, 1979, p. 44, letter to the editor.

One can see the methods General EISENHOWER's helpers used outgoing messages suppressed or manipulated.

## »We are ready« or: why the German troops were not alerted in time

On June 4, 1944, Reich Minister of Propaganda GOEBBELS declared at a large NSDAP rally in Nuremberg: "In the face of all these Jewish tricks and attempts at intimidation, we can only say: We are ready! If the enemy comes, our soldiers will teach him a lesson."

This was preceded by a report accidentally published by the American news agency AP late in the evening of June 3, 1944, according to which General EISENHOWER's headquarters announced the Allied landing in France. This message was stopped 30 seconds later and denied 28 minutes later, but had 500 US radio stations as well as stations in Chile and Cuba

this message already sent. Even special services were scheduled, and a baseball game had been suspended for a minute's prayer.<sup>1</sup> These were all just signs of nervousness in the face of the imminent landing.

In reality, when the landing actually took place only a few days later, the German troops were far from ready to defend themselves.

The secret as to when the decision day, or 'D-Day' for short, was to take place was one of the greatest war secrets of the Allies, and a large army of German counterintelligence agents naturally tried to discover this secret.

As early as October 24, 1943, the Office for Foreign Affairs/Counterfeiting was able to report to the OKW that the start of the invasion would be communicated to the resistance fighters in France by a series of ›messages personnels‹, including lines from the poem »Das Herbstlied« as a key code word. by Paul VERLAINE. The leaders of the French resistance organizations were instructed to listen carefully to the BBC's French broadcasts on the 1st, 2nd, 15th and 16th of each month and to pay attention to this code word. If the first line came from the autumn song, it meant the invasion was imminent. It was the alarm signal. From then on, the radio broadcasts had to be listened to constantly to wait for the second half of the verse, the so-called B message, the action signal. This means the invasion is coming within the next 48 hours.

<sup>1</sup> Janusz PIEKALKIEWICZ, *Invasion. France 1944*, Southwest, Munich 1979, pp. 106 and 118.

<sup>2</sup> Oskar REILE, *The German Secret Service in the IL World War. Western Front*, Weltbild, Augsburg 1989, pp. 348-352.

<sup>3</sup> David IRVING, *Battle for Europe. With the courage of desperation against the invasion of 1944*, DSZ, Munich 2004, p. 82.

As early as May 1, 1944, the OB West intelligence unit intercepted several other ›messages personnels‹, including the first line of VERLAINE's poem »Herbstlied«. <sup>2, 3</sup> Immediately the

7th and 15th Armies alerted. However, the second line did not follow, so that the German troops were in vain on alert.

On June 1, 1944, at around 6:00 p.m., the counter-intelligence in Paris, while listening to the BBC transmitter, reported that 26 "*messages person nels*" had just been transmitted, which were intended for the relevant units of the Résistance and the SOE Troops 'on extra alert' meant 'the invasion may begin at any moment!' What made the news even more believable for Colonel REILE was that the English were giving those Resistance groups they suspected German infiltration (the Colonel knew which units they were...) sent no "*messages personnels*" for activation. In addition, almost only the groups based in the areas of Normandy, Bretagne and Amiens/Lille (supply routes for Normandy/ Brittany, but not for the Pas-de-Calais) received their activation messages. From this, REILE could read the direction of the invasion: Normandy or Brittany, but not Pas de Calais!

That same evening, Colonel Oskar REILE briefed the Commander-in-Chief West, the military commander in France, and Colonel ROHLEDER, the old counter-espionage chief in Berlin, by telephone and telex. The next day he also submitted a detailed written report to these three offices.

In fact, HITLER was informed of the first report on June 2, and the OKW forwarded this report from the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) to the Army's Foreign Army West department. This office, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Alexis VON ROENNE, was responsible for informing the Wehrmacht about the enemy situation in the west, but nothing was done there and the western army was left completely ignorant of the impending Allied landing.<sup>1</sup> The defensive soldiers listened with great excitement in Paris every new BBC broadcast.

Finally, on the English channel on May 5th

At around 6:00 p.m. on June 2nd, the long-awaited messages were broadcast, which meant for the recipients: »The invasion begins. Get to work immediately on carrying out the tasks assigned to you for day X!«

Colonel REILE immediately reported the alarming situation verbally to the relevant command staffs, primarily to the Commander-in-Chief West. Finally he prepared a written report and drove at a breakneck speed to St. Germain. There he handed his report to Major BRINK, an Ic Auxiliary to the Commander-in-Chief West. brought in this report

<sup>1</sup> David IRVING, Battle for Europe. With the courage of despair against the invasion of 1944, DSZ, Munich 2004,

REILE stated with all determination that the invasion had now begun. Orally he told Major BRINK that he was convinced that the Germans could expect enemy troops to land on the Channel coast, around Le Havre, within the next few hours. REILE also apparently knew that in view of the 'special circumstances' in the highest German command posts in the west, this report would otherwise not reach its destination, but would instead be bagged somewhere. Nevertheless, this is exactly what happened.

But not only the defense of Colonel REILE in Paris, but also other German troops had caught the poem by Paul VERLAINE . Specialists from the 15th German Army under the command of Generaloberst SALMUTH (Tourcoing Headquarters), deployed between the Seine and the Maas, had listened to the lines of the poem agreed upon for the beginning of the invasion and reported them back. The war diary of the Fifteenth Army contains five entries for June 5, 1944. The first says that the newsroom had listened to the first part of the VERLAINE verse on June 1, 2, and 3. The second entry reports at 9:15 p.m. on June 5, 1944: "The second half of the spell. The third, fourth and fifth entries at 9:30 p.m. revealed the writer's almost traumatic excitement. They state that the sensational news, the great secret, was passed on to the Chief of the 15th Army, the Commander-in-Chief West, a few General Commands, the Flak Division, the commanders in Belgium and France, as well as Army Group B and the OKW in Rastenburg would."

By 10:15 p.m. on June 5, 1944 at the latest, all important authorities knew that the invasion was imminent. Joseph GOEBBELS also confirmed this in his diaries, he wrote: »When we drove down to Berchtesgaden at 4:00 a.m. (on June 6, 1944 – note GEORG) , it was already dawning. At 10:00 p.m. the first messages came, which we took from the enemy radio traffic, according to which the invasion is to begin that night. I don't think this news is serious at first. But then they thicken. When I arrive in Berchtesgaden, the documents are more authentic. They indicate that the invasion will increase in the early hours of the morning, in the west. That would have been the decisive day of this war."<sup>1</sup> At about 4:30 a.m., the OKW itself informed the OKH responsible for the eastern front that the Norman invasion had begun

the. When this message was immediately transmitted to the OKH operations chief, General HEUSINGER, the later NATO general only said that he had been expecting this message for a long time.<sup>1</sup>

Although it is now absolutely certain that the responsible German authorities knew exactly when the invasion began, this did not harm the Allies.

General SPEIDEL, who was Field Marshal ROMMEL 's Chief of Staff, played a key role here . In the absence of his boss, who was celebrating his wife's birthday in Herrlingen, Württemberg, he managed ROMMEL's business.

SPEIDEL failed to alert the 7th Army, which lay at the heart of the coming invasion. 2-4 Col. STAUBWASSER , the intelligence chief who reported to SPEIDEL , testified that at 10:00 p.m VERLAINE cue with subsequent alerting of the army. STAUBWATER immediately reported this to General SPEIDEL . Allegedly, however, he did not want to know the meaning of this keyword. He had STAUBWATER inquire at VON RUNDSTEDT at headquarters. STAUBWASSER later made the following statement during an interrogation: »With this telephone conversation, which I personally conducted, a staff officer sent the order of OB West to refrain from alarming all troops.«

The question immediately arises as to who the alleged staff officer on special assignment was here. Anyone who is familiar with military matters knows that it is impossible for a full-grown colonel, and a general staff officer at that, to take such an instruction from a stranger and allow himself to be fobbed off.

Colonel Bodo VON ZIMMERMANN from VON RUNDSTEDT 's staff later claimed that all troops in the West had been put on alert. While he was a prisoner of war in the United States, he declared: "Army Group B, which was aware of this report, received the order from RUNDSTEDT to order alert level 2, the highest alert level, for its entire command area." According to Colonel VON ZIMMERMANN , this process was completed shortly after midnight , when reports of a landing in France had not yet come in. Accordingly, all German forces in the west, including the navy and air force, should have been on high alert when the first Allied paratroopers dropped, which was not the case.

This brings the buck to the Army General Staff

1 Bernd FREYTAG VON LORINGHOFEN, *With Hitler in the bunker*, Wis 2006, p. 42 f.

2 *Deutsche National*

*Zeitung*, p. 1, no. 23, June 3, 1994 (SPEIDEL, JÜNGER).

3 Paul CARELL, *They are coming*, Ullstein, Berlin 1997, pp. 34-39.

4 Cornelius RYAN, »The Longest Day«, in: *Secret command matter. Behind the Scenes of the Second World War*, Vol. 2, "The Best" 1965, p. 428.

group B and means that the statements made by SPEIDEL and STAUBWATER are most likely incorrect. In reality , on the morning of June 5, General SPEIDEL, who was one of the conspirators against HITLER , telephoned Paris co-conspirators and invited them to an evening drink at the Castle of La Roche-Guyon, the headquarters of Field Marshal ROMMEL . After the feudal evening meal, people strolled in the park and SPEIDEL discussed the declaration drafted by JÜNGER with Ernst JÜNGER and others present , which was to be announced after HITLER's fall. "The cognac enlivened the conversation in warm, golden streams." (Original sound JÜNGER)<sup>1</sup> Then SPEIDEL received the news about the beginning of the invasion.

<sup>1</sup> Quoted from: David IR

VING, *Battle for Europe. With the courage of desperation against the invasion of 1944*, DSZ, Munich 2004, p. 84 f.



Major General Max PEMSEL.

But SPEIDEL's 'failure' , which from today's perspective cannot be excused, went even further: As he himself reported, he made every effort to calm down OB West and the OKW in many telephone calls so that they did nothing of their own accord. In fact, the OKW and OB West then refrained from using the alarm measures that were possible for them during these crucial first hours.

From 1:35 a.m. the chief of staff of the 7th Army (it was the main target of the Allies), Major General Max PEMSEL, often telephoned General SPEIDEL. The latter repeatedly reassured his opponent that the enemy in Normandy was only undertaking a "locally limited" advance. He skillfully sowed doubts in PEMSEL's mind , based on the fact that although the Allies had landed from the air and started shelling the coast with naval guns at 5:30 a.m., no troops from the sea had yet landed. Oddly enough, there is then a two-and-a-half-hour gap in the war diary of the Army Group B staff. Does that mean that SPEIDEL's staff slept from 6:40 a.m. to 9:05 a.m. - at which time the troops had actually landed? SPEIDEL, the ingenious delayer, later answered when asked about this gap in the war diary: "Yes, it's quite possible that we all went back to bed." Coincidentally, SPEIDEL had also "forgotten", his boss, Field Marshal ROMMEL to notify in Herrlingen, because opposite ROMMEL also showed SPEIDEL his own! famous "nerve strength": Field Marshal ROMMEL did not call him that night, as would have been the case, but only the next morning at around 10:15 a.m., when the landing of the troops was already in full swing. Even then, SPEIDEL's report to ROMMEL was not clear, but he informed his boss that it was not yet known whether it was the invasion at all, and that he

call him again later. Did SPEIDEL want to stall his boss again? However, ROMMEL immediately packed up and drove back to his French headquarters in one hell of a ride. The fact remains that the troops in Normandy spent 14 decisive hours without their commander-in-chief.

General SPEIDEL was arrested in September 1944. Another reason was the accusation that the 7th Army had deliberately not been alerted immediately in order not to unnecessarily complicate the landing of the Allies and their immediate march through France. Anthony Cave BROWN claims this in his book *The Invisible Front*. BROWN adds: »Later rumors circulated that the Allies, mainly Americans, had rewarded him with the NATO high command after the war.«<sup>1</sup>

1 Anthony Cave  
BROWN, *The invisible  
front*, Desch, Munich 1976.

## **General Speidel ensured the absence of Field Marshal Rommel on June 6, 1944**

For General EISENHOWER's German helpers, Field Marshal ROMMEL's absence was of crucial importance, because only then could they make the most important decisions themselves.

This was all the more important as ROMMEL did not join the conspirators, although like so many other German military leaders he tolerated their activities within his ranks.

As I said, Erwin ROMMEL went to Herrlingen on June 5, 1944 to celebrate his wife's 50th birthday.

At first, Erwin ROMMEL had no intention of leaving France because of the risk of landing. Around May 31, however, SPEIDEL persuaded his boss to go on vacation. Reassuring reconnaissance flights by the Luftwaffe and tide tables, which only made a landing appear possible after June 20, played a fatal role – both of which affected the Pas-de-Calais!

The former ›Desert Fox‹ ROMMEL allowed himself to be misled, took part in a hunt on June 2nd and a day later went to Paris to see Gerd VON RUNDSTEDT and to buy shoes for his wife.

In 1949, SPEIDEL made a contortion in his book *Die Invasion 1944* to explain ROMMEL 's trip to Germany, which was actually inappropriate . Eventually he constructed a political mission from ROM MEL to HITLER to end the war in the west before the invasion would break out. None of this applies.

In violation of his official regulations, General SPEIDEL failed to call his commander back from Herrlingen on the night of June 5, 1944, when the first reports of the start of the invasion came in.

General SPEIDEL wrote in his book *Invasion 1944* that he called ROMMEL for the first time on June 6, 1944 between 6:00 and 6:30 a.m. Even that would have been much too late.

According to the war diary of Army Group B, SPEIDEL actually called ROMMEL at 10:15 a.m. ROMMEL had turned deathly pale. With the words "Too stupid, too stupid of me," he immediately packed up and drove back. ROMMEL did not arrive at La Roche-Guyon headquarters between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. , as SPEIDEL noted, but only at 9:30 p.m.<sup>1</sup> Decisive events of the day of the invasion had already occurred at this point in time – without them him!

<sup>1</sup> Heinz SCHMOLKE,  
*The War Decision.*  
*Treason in Normandy,*  
Historia, Horb 2004, pp.  
33-39

### **"Then the invasion has already failed." The background of a tragic mistake**

As already mentioned, ROMMEL's Chief of Staff SPEIDEL had not only failed to alert Army Group B in good time and to recall his Chief ROMMEL on the night of the invasion , but he also used all his intelligence and powers of persuasion to render the increasingly concrete reports about the imminent major landing harmless to pull.

He was either talking about local advances, or he suggested the possibility that the Allied parachutists were merely bailed out crews from Allied aircraft that had made an emergency landing, although at about 5:15 a.m. on June 6 Germans were in a downed Allied cargo glider found a map of Caen.

Even when General PEMSEL reported at 6:15 a.m. that the Allied naval guns had suddenly begun shelling the German coastal defense position, SPEIDEL contradicted him with such conviction that the Chief of Staff of the 7th Army completely contradicted his previous view in the war diary entered: "Intentions of the coastal bombardment are not yet recognizable, all in all it seems to be about diversionary attacks, in connection with later attacks at other places." In fact, at 05:45 General PEMSEL mediated the neighboring



15th Army in the Pas-de-Calais that the Army High Command of the 7th The army reckoned with being able to restore the situation with its own forces, and that despite the shelling there had still been no attempts to land from the sea, SPEIDEL's view had won across the board! When Colonel-General VON SALMUTH, Commander-in-Chief of the 15th Army, heard this, he said to his chief of staff with relief: "Then the invasion has already failed!" and went to bed. At 5:58 a.m. the sun rose on the Normandy coast, but at 5:25 a.m. 32 American amphibious tanks launched into the water in the "Omaha" invasion sector as the first landing vehicles of the invasion.

At about 6:30 a.m., the bulk of the Allied landing forces began crossing over to land.

Again the Allies had achieved their goal. Around 9:00 a.m. on the 6th. By June 1st, much of the German coastal defenses were all but overrun, but even at this late point in time, thanks to the efforts of people like SPEIDEL and STAUBWASSER, neither Field Marshal VON RUNDSTEDT nor Generaloberst JODL, Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff at the OKW, had an overview of the real situation on the beaches.

### **The failure to alert (summary)**

"Our tactical surprise had succeeded to such an extent that we had scarcely dared to hope..." (General EISEN HOWER)

It was thanks to cool calculations by conspirators that the defense of the Atlantic front was not alarmed in the first half of the night of June 5/6, despite early warning of the start of the invasion. The decisive factor was the absence of the Commander-in-Chief of Army Group B, Field Marshal ROMMEL, who was represented on that crucial night by his Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General SPEIDEL. General SPEIDEL, who was also given a free hand by the Commander-in-Chief West, Field Marshal VON RUNDSTEDT, failed to raise the alarm and successfully deceived the Wehrmacht High Command. He was supported in this by a number of like-minded people on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief West, in the OKW and in the Luftwaffe.

So that the commanders of the affected battalions, regiments and divisions in the landing sector do not act on their own as soon as the first news about the Allied landing arrives.

There was an order from the highest level (signature?) stating that it was strictly forbidden to engage in combat without clearance from Army Group B.

Another nail was forged for the coffin of the western German army.

## **Detachment 2: Defenders without commanders**

1 David IRVING, *Battle for Europe. With the courage of desperation against the invasion of 1944*, DSZ, Munich 2004, p. 80.

2 Janusz PIEKALKTEWICZ, *Invasion. France 1944*, Southwest, Munich 1979, pp. 121, 126, 146 and 168.

3 Hans SPEIDEL, *Invasion 1944. A contribution to Rommel and the fate of the Reich*, Rainer Wunderlich, Tübingen 1949, p. 97.

4 David C. ISBY (ed.), *The German Army at D-Day* (Greenhill 2004), p. 225.

On the 5th/6th By June 1944, almost all of the important German commanders were away from their headquarters. To date, it has not been satisfactorily explained why this was so.<sup>1-5</sup>

General Field Marshal VON RUNDSTEDT, the Commander-in-Chief in the west, left his headquarters on Monday 5 June 1944 to visit the coastal fortifications in the Normandy with his son.

Admiral Theodor KRANCKE, the Naval Commander West, departed for Bordeaux on Monday 5 June 1944 for an inspection trip.

Colonel- General VON SALMUTH, Commander-in-Chief of the 5th Army in the Pas-de-Calais, was hunting in the Ardennes.

On June 5, 1944, Colonel- General DOLLMANN, Commander-in-Chief of the 7th Army (Normandie), prepared a planning game on defense against invasion for the following day in Rennes (Brittany). DOLLMANN had ordered all the divisional commanders, one regimental commander from each division, the corps artillery commanders and the commanders of the 7th Army's corps headquarters to Rennes, where from 8:30 a.m. on June 6, 1944, they played all day at a war game maps and plans should spend. This led to the fact that, for example, Lieutenant General HELMICH (243 Inf./Div.), Lieutenant General VON SCHLIEBEN (709 Inf./Div.) and Lieutenant General FALLEY (91st Airborne Division), as ordered, on the evening of the 4th Departed for Rennes in June 1944.

Few commanders like Lieutenant General KRAISS, commander of the 352nd Infantry Division, were at their headquarters during the crucial first hours of the invasion. Contrary to all other units, KRAISS had ordered an alert exercise for his division, so that the Americans encountered a fully defensive, alerted troop in the 'Omaha' section of beach - with correspondingly terrible results for the attackers. DOLLMANN had also 'accidentally' called off an alarm exercise planned for the night of the invasion by the 7th Army. The invasion forces would be up in that case

a fully defensive ›Atlantic Wall‹ rolled up. Was this to be prevented?

To this day it is not clear whether General DOLLMANN started the war game in Rennes on his own initiative or whether there was a 'higher' order to do so. DOLLMANN's suicide on June 28, 1944 left no room for an answer here.

In addition to these "ordered" absences, there were also private undertakings by leading generals. Thus, on June 5, 1944, Lieutenant General FEUCHTINGER, the commander of the 21st Panzer Division, went on a pleasure trip to the nightclubs of Paris together with his 1st General Staff Officer.


The absence of so many German commanders on 5./6. June 1944 was to have the worst consequences for the German defenders. This concerned the issue of timely alerting as well as the organization of counterattacks against the Allied troops who had landed and were initially weak. Thus, in the absence of the commanding generals in the section from Ste. Mère-Eglise hunted senselessly against the American troops by four regiments much too late and without artillery and tank destroyer support. It is striking here that, as with many such mistakes, the originators of these orders have not been made known to this day. This alone gives food for thought.


The worst consequence for the German troops in Normandy, however, was that the absence of the commanders left the management of anti-invasion defenses during these crucial hours in the hands of the likes of General SPEIDEL and other 'command representatives'.

Both Field Marshal ROMMEL and HITLER ordered an investigation on June 9, 1944 to clarify why the commanders in charge on June 5/6. June were not in their command posts. HITLER believed (perhaps not without justification?) in an action by the English secret service.

However, the pressure of military events and delaying measures by high-ranking German circles prevented the investigations. Thus, on the evening of July 4, 1944, Colonel von TEMPELHOFF reported to the Chief of Staff of the 7th Army, Major General PEMSEL : "The commission of inquiry to clarify the events of July 5/6 June 1944 is no longer an option.« Full of self-confidence , SPEIDEL mocked that this was HITLER's »big request for underwear«!

So the question remains open to this day.





**Department 3: Neglecting staff work: table tennis and leadership chaos** »When I went to the front, which

was the case almost every day, I could rely on SPEIDEL to give my orders, as discussed before, to the armies and to superior and equivalent departments conducted all meetings in my interest.« (Field Marshal Erwin ROMMEL in September 1944 in a letter to Adolf HITLER).

It is an undisputed fact that in the first few days after the start of the Allied landing there was chaos of orders on the German side. In short, there was a lack of staff coordination of the instructions from the OKW, Commander-in-Chief West, Army Group B, 7th Army, Panzer Group West and I SS Panzer Corps.

This was not the fault of Field Marshal ROMMEL, who visited advanced command posts and troop leaders every day from morning to night to personally check on things and give instructions.

A different spirit of work prevailed after the landing began at Army Group B headquarters in La Roche-Guyon. Hardly that ROMMEL drove to the front in the morning, the headquarters of Army Group B went to the table tennis room. General SPEIDEL and Admiral

The Castle of La Roche-Guyon (north west of Paris), the headquarters of Rommel's Army Group B from March 1944.

